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Theses
•	The	oil	 sector	does	not	play	a	major	 role	 in	 the	Ukrainian	energy	 indus-
try	and	has	smaller	economic	and	political	significance	than	the	gas,	coal	
and	nuclear	sectors.	The	share	of	petroleum	fuels	in	the	Ukrainian	energy	
balance	is	around	10%	and	has	remained	on	a	similar	 level	over	the	past	
few	years.	The	issues	linked	to	the	Ukrainian	fuel	sector	are	rarely	given	
publicity	in	the	mass	media.	Meanwhile,	a	comprehensive	analysis	reveals	
that	there	has	been	a	painful	and	long-lasting	downturn	in	this	strategic	
branch	of	the	economy.	The	situation	is	unlikely	to	improve	significantly	in	
the	coming	years.	The	state	of	the	fuel	sector	is	a	good	case	study	which	lays	
bare	the	numerous	weaknesses	of	the	Ukrainian	state.	
•	Petrol	and	diesel	oil	 consumption	 in	Ukraine	has	 fallen	by	over	40%	 in	
the	past	decade	to	8	million	tonnes	in	2016	(for	comparison:	this	figure	is	
approximately	22.5	million	tonnes	in	Poland).	What	once	was	a	powerful	
Ukrainian	refining	sector	has	been	plunged	in	a	deep	crisis	for	years.	Only	
one	out	of	the	six	existing	refineries	is	currently	in	operation,	using	only	
a	small	section	of	its	production	capacity.	For	years	all	the	refining	com-
panies	have	suffered	from	underinvestment,	have	not	been	modernised	
and	have	been	unable	to	produce	fuels	in	the	quantities	and	at	the	quality	
required	by	the	market.	Another	problem	that	has	remained	unresolved	
for	years	is	the	supply	of	crude	oil	to	be	processed.	As	a	result,	Ukrainian	
refineries	are	the	most	outdated	in	Europe,	and	the	oil	processing	output	
in	Ukraine	has	 reached	a	 record-low	 level	of	 around	2.5	million	 tonnes	
annually.	
•	The	current	situation	 in	 the	Ukrainian	oil	 sector	 is	a	consequence	of	 the	
lack	of	 state	 supervision.	The	government	has	 failed	 to	develop	an	effec-
tive	 strategy	 for	developing	 this	 section	of	 the	 economy	and	 for	 combat-
ing	the	systemic	corruption	among	the	Ukrainian	ruling	class.	This	led	to	
the	privatisation	concept	adopted	in	the	late	1990s	failing	and	the	sale	of	
key	 refineries	 to	 Russian	 companies.	 Furthermore,	 subsequent	 Ukrain-
ian	governments	accepted	the	situation	in	which	the	key	state-owned	oil	
producing	 (Ukrnafta,	 UkrGasVydobuvannya)	 or	 transporting	 companies	
(Ukrtransnafta)	became	de facto	controlled	by	the	oligarchs.	Although	this	
situation	has	improved	over	the	past	two	years,	Ukrnafta,	Ukraine’s	largest	
oil	producer,	is	still	controlled	by	Privat	Group	which	has	led	the	company	
to	the	brink	of	bankruptcy,	siphoning	off	billions	of	dollars	from	it	over	the	
past	few	years.	
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
6
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
4/
20
17
•	The	government	 lifted	customs	duty	on	 fuel	exports	 in	2005	as	a	conse-
quence	of	the	backwardness	and	ineffectiveness	of	the	Ukrainian	refiner-
ies	but	this	only	worsened	their	crisis	condition.	This	decision,	which	is	
still	binding,	has	caused	an	extensive	influx	of	foreign	petroleum	products	
to	the	Ukrainian	market.	While	the	share	of	imported	fuels	in	total	con-
sumption	was	under	 10%	a	decade	ago,	 its	present	 level	 is	85%.	Ukraine	
thus	relies	heavily	on	fuel	supplies	from	other	countries,	mainly	Belarus,	
Russia	and	Lithuania.	Belarusian	fuels	have	gained	an	especially	strong	
position,	winning	 half	 of	 the	Ukrainian	 petrol	 and	 diesel	 oil	market	 in	
2016.	Despite	the	emergence	of	the	competitive	import	and	retail	fuel	sale	
market	(which	has	a	positive	influence	on	fuel	prices)	this	long-term	situ-
ation	adversely	affects	the	Ukrainian	trade	balance	and	energy	security.	
Ukraine	is	the	only	European	state	of	this	size	to	rely	so	heavily	on	foreign	
fuel	supplies.	
•	Fuel	fraud	on	a	massive	scale	and	illegal	imports	are	important	factors	af-
fecting	the	situation	in	the	Ukrainian	fuel	sector	since	they	create	the	grey	
economy.	The	scale	of	this	phenomenon	is	difficult	to	determine	precisely,	
but	the	likely	market	share	of	illegal	fuel	in	total	consumption	is	up	to	25%.	
The	profitability	of	this	kind	of	trade	along	with	the	fact	that	government	
representatives	are	its	real	patrons	are	the	essential	factors	which	have	led	
to	the	present	situation	in	the	Ukrainian	fuel	sector.	One	consequence	for	
the	customers	is	the	presence	of	low-quality	fuel.	
•	The	situation	 in	 the	 fuel	 sector	has	changed	 to	a	very	small	extent	 since	
the	Ukrainian	revolution	of	2013/2014.	The	country	has	succeeded	in	curb-
ing	illegal	fuel	imports	and	eliminating	from	the	market	some	of	the	firms	
engaged	in	this	which	were	linked	to	the	previous	government	elite.	How-
ever,	the	main	problems	of	the	sector	have	remained	unresolved—an	effec-
tive	management	of	the	state-owned	oil	companies	and	a	vision	for	the	sec-
tor’s	comprehensive	development	are	still	missing,	and	the	share	of	illegal	
fuel	in	total	fuel	sale	is	still	high.	The	corruption	level	in	this	sector	is	still	
high	because	of	its	profitability.	As	a	result,	 it	may	be	concluded	that	the	
sector’s	degradation	has	continued	after	the	Maidan	revolution.	
•		Ukrainian	 refineries	 are	unlikely	 to	be	modernised	 in	 the	 coming	years	
given	the	huge	costs	of	the	investments	required,	since	most	of	the	instal-
lations	would	practically	need	to	be	built	from	scratch.	Furthermore,	some	
refineries	are	subject	 to	ownership	dispute	 (Odessa),	while	others	 (Lysy-
chansk,	 controlled	 by	 Russia’s	 Rosneft)	 are	 located	 next	 to	 the	 military	
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front	line	in	the	Donbas.	This	means	that	the	share	of	imported	fuels	in	the	
Ukrainian	market	will	remain	at	around	80–85%.	
•		Russian	 fuel	 supplies	 via	 the	 product	 oil	 pipeline	 PrikarpatZapadTrans	
were	launched	in	June	2016.	Ukraine	imported	0.85	million	tonnes	of	Rus-
sian	diesel	oil	via	this	channel	in	the	following	six	months.	A	Russian	firm	
gained	control	over	this	strategic	enterprise	in	unusual	circumstances	in	
2015	as	a	result	of	a	Ukrainian	court’s	decision.	If	the	present	level	of	sup-
plies	is	maintained	in	the	future,	Russian	diesel	oil	may	gain	around	half	of	
the	market	share	of	Ukraine’s	diesel	oil.	The	scheme	of	imports	from	Russia	
suggests	that	this	project	is	covered	by	the	corruption-based	patronage	of	
one	of	the	groups	in	the	present	Ukrainian	government	elite.	
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I. Fuel consumptIon on the ukraInIan market
The	oil	sector	in	Ukraine	is	less	significant	than	the	gas,	coal	and	nuclear	sec-
tors	which	form	the	core	of	the	Ukrainian	energy	sector.	This	is	because	pe-
troleum	products	play	a	 lesser	 role	 in	 the	 country’s	 energy	balance	 (9.4%	 in	
20151;	for	comparison,	in	Poland	this	figure	is	approximately	24%),	and	because	
the	crude	oil	and	fuel	supply	to	Ukraine	is	not	so	much	a	political	issue	as	is	
the	case	with	natural	gas.	Throughout	the	twenty-five	years	of	Ukraine’s	 in-
dependence,	Russian	gas	imports	have	been	one	of	the	key	issues	in	Ukraine’s	
foreign	and	domestic	policy.	
Chart 1. Ukraine’s energy balance in 2015 
natural gas – 36.6%
nuclear energy – 27.9%
coal – 20.8%
oil – 9.4%
biomass – 4.3%
hydro energy – 0.8%
solar/wind energy – 0.4%
Data: Draft Energy Strategy of Ukraine to 2035 (December 2016)
Over	the	past	few	years,	the	consumption	level	of	the	two	key	fuels,	i.e.	pet-
rol	and	diesel	gas,	in	Ukraine	usually	reached	10–11	million	tonnes	annually.	It	
was	only	from	2013	that	demand	for	these	products	began	to	fall	at	a	fast	rate,	
reaching	 8.1	million	 tonnes	 in	 2016.	While	 diesel	 oil	 consumption	 remained	
at	a	 level	of	 around	5.5–6	million	 tonnes,	petrol	 consumption	 level	 fell	 from	
5.3	million	tonnes	in	2008	to	2.2	million	in	2016.	As	shown	in	the	chart	below,	
total	 petrol	 and	diesel	 oil	 consumption	 fell	 by	27%	 in	 2007–2016,	 and	petrol	
consumption	fell	by	as	much	as	58%	in	this	period,	while	diesel	oil	consump-
tion	returned	to	a	similar	previous	level	after	an	initial	fall	2.	
1	 Data	for	2015.	According	to	the	draft	Energy	Strategy	of	Ukraine	to	2035,	the	share	of	pe-
troleum	products	in	the	energy	balance	has	remained	at	a	level	of	10–11%	over	the	past	few	
years;	http://mpe.kmu.gov.ua/minugol/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=245165746&cat_
id=245165726	
	 In	the	case	of	Poland,	these	are	data	from	the	Central	Statistical	Office	(GUS)	for	2015.	
2	 When	quoting	Ukrainian	statistics	concerning	the	oil	sector,	it	is	necessary	to	take	into	ac-
count	the	differences	(approximately	10%)	between	the	data	published	by	the	Ukrainian	
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Chart 2. Petrol, diesel oil and LPG consumption in Ukraine (million tonnes)
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Data: State Statistics Service of Ukraine 
A	fall	that	large	was	brought	about	by	a	number	of	factors,	the	most	important	
of	which	are:
 – the economic crisis which has significantly undermined economic activity;
 – the loss of crimea and the outbreak of war in the Donbas which used to 
have a 10% share in total fuel consumption in Ukraine;
 – the fact that car owners are shifting from petrol to lpG – LPG con-
sumption has significantly increased over the past few years.
The	rapid	decrease	in	petrol	demand	visible	in	the	structure	of	fuel	demand	is	
above	all	an	effect	of	the	increasing	popularity	of	LPG,	which	is	a	much	cheap-
er	fuel	(over	the	past	two	years	the	price	of	LPG	was	equivalent	to	46%	of	the	
petrol	price).	This	results	in	drivers	shifting	to	the	cheaper	fuel	on	a	massive	
scale3.	As	demand	for	LPG	grew,	the	existing	suppliers	(mainly	Russia	and	Be-
larus)	were	unable	to	supply	the	necessary	quantities,	and	this	brought	about	
Ministry	for	Energy	and	Coal	Mining,	the	State	Statistics	Service,	the	State	Fiscal	Service,	
and	the	data	from	the	agencies	researching	the	fuel	market.	The	differences	result	from	the	
application	of	different	methods	of	calculation,	the	fact	that	state	institutions	do	not	take	
into	account	Ukrtatnafta’s	output	(it	has	not	revealed	statistical	data	to	state	institutions	
since	2014),	and	the	grey	economy.
3	 C.	Куюн,	Осенние	„цыплята”	топливного	рынка,	Zerkalo Nedeli,	25	November	2016;	http://
gazeta.zn.ua/energy_market/osennie-cyplyata-toplivnogo-rynka-_.html	
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the	need	to	import	LPG	from	such	exotic	directions	as	Greece	and	Egypt.	While	
in	2012	LPG	had	a	17%	share	in	the	structure	of	retail	sales	at	Ukrainian	filling	
stations,	in	2016	its	share	rose	to	around	33%4.
It	was	possible	to	slow	down	the	fall	in	consumption	of	the	main	fuels	in	2016.	
As	Ukraine’s	GDP	grew	by	2%	and	industrial	production	by	2.4%,	the	demand	
for	diesel	oil	increased	by	9.1%	and	for	petrol	by	8.8%5.	Another	factor	was	the	
reduction	of	the	grey	economy’s	share	in	total	fuel	sales.	
There	is	an	upward	tendency	in	LPG’s	popularity	in	Ukraine;	its	sales	reached	
1.46	million	tonnes	in	2016.	The	consumption	of	this	fuel	has	increased	by	90%	
over	the	past	five	years,	and	it	grew	by	33%	in	2016	alone	(when	compared	to	
the	preceding	year).	Ukraine	has	thus	become	one	of	the	world’s	top	ten	LPG	
consumers	in	the	transport	sector.	LPG	owes	its	popularity	not	only	to	its	at-
tractive	price	but	also	the	low	quality	of	petrol	and	diesel	oil	sold	at	Ukrainian	
filling	stations.	
4	 A.	Куюн,	Заправленные	и	счастливые,	Business.ua,	27	June	2016;	http://www.business.
ua/companies/zapravlennye_i_schastlivye-344802/	
5	 Data	from	the	consulting	agency	A-95	http://ukrchem.dp.ua/2017/01/25/ukraina-balans-
rynka-nefteproduktov-v-2016-godu.html	According	to	data	from	the	Ministry	of	Energy	
http://mpe.kmu.gov.ua/minugol/control/uk/publish/printable_article?art_id=245178477,	
diesel	oil	consumption	grew	by	1.7%,	and	petrol	consumption	fell	by	9.2%.
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II. the Fall oF the ukraInIan reFInerIes
There	are	six	refineries	in	Ukraine.	In	the	early	1990s,	their	total	production	
capacity	reached	51	million	tonnes.	The	refineries	have	not	been	modernised	
for	many	years;	they	are	technologically	outdated	and	unable	to	produce	high-
quality	fuel	in	the	quantities	demanded	by	the	market.	Four	of	the	refineries	
(Odessa,	Kherson	and	western	Ukraine’s	Nadvirna	and	Drohobych)	were	built	
before	World	War	II,	and	the	remaining	two	(Kremenchuk	and	Lysychansk)	in	
the	1960s	and	1970s.	
Oil	refining	output	exceeded	37	million	tonnes	immediately	after	the	collapse	
of	the	USSR	and	began	to	fall	rapidly,	down	to	8.5	million	tonnes	in	2000.	At	
that	 time	 the	 refineries	were	 operating	 under	market	 conditions	 and	were	
not	subsidised	by	the	state	(unlike	with	the	gas	market).	Russia	was	the	only	
source	of	oil	imports,	but	the	supplies	were	becoming	increasingly	irregular	
and	were	organised	under	short-term	contracts.	As	a	result,	it	became	neces-
sary	to	import	petroleum	products	on	a	large	scale.	
 Chart 3. Oil processing at Ukrainian refineries (million tonnes)
200820062004200220001998199619941992 2010 2012 2014 20160
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Data: State Statistics Service of Ukraine, Ministry of Energy and Coal Mining 
The	increasing	problems	with	the	oil	supply	drove	Kyiv	to	decide	to	sell	the	re-
fineries	to	Russian	oil	companies.	This	decision	was	dictated	by	the	belief	that	
it	would	lead	to	oil	supplies	being	guaranteed.	A	37.5%	stake	in	the	Kremen-
chuk	refinery	was	sold	in	1991.	It	is	Ukraine’s	largest	refinery;	its	processing	
capacity	at	that	time	reached	18.6	million	tonnes.	The	stake	was	bought	by	Rus-
sia’s	Tatneft	and	the	government	of	Tatarstan.	As	a	result	of	the	transaction,	
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the	business	was	used	as	a	base	for	creating	a	company	named	Ukrtatnafta.	
The	decision	resulted	from	the	fact	that	the	refinery	had	been	traditionally	ad-
justed	to	processing	heavy	Tatar	oil.	In	the	following	years	the	share	of	Russian	
entities	in	the	shareholding	structure	rose	to	55.7%,	while	that	of	the	Ukrain-
ian	state	shrank	to	43%.
In	1999–2000,	Russians	gained	control	of	three	more	refineries:	Kherson	(Al-
lians),	Odessa	(LUKoil)	and	Lysychansk	(TNK).	The	value	of	all	the	three	trans-
actions	was	far	below	the	companies’	market	prices.	The	two	smallest	refin-
eries,	Drohobych	and	Nadvirna,	were	privatised	at	the	same	time.	They	were	
taken	over	by	Ukrainian	capital	(Privat	Group	controlled	by	the	oligarchs	Ihor	
Kolomoyskyi	and	Henadiy	Boholyubov).	
One	consequence	of	 the	privatisation	of	Ukraine’s	most	 important	refineries	
was	the	intensification	of	Russian	oil	supplies	which	thus	resolved	the	problem	
with	 the	 shortage	 of	 crude	 oil	 supplies.	 In	 2003–2004,	Ukrainian	 refineries	
processed	21–22	million	tonnes	of	oil	annually,	reaching	the	highest	level	since	
the	early	1990s.	This	not	only	allowed	supplies	to	the	domestic	market	to	be	en-
sure	but	also	the	export	of	part	of	the	output.	At	the	same	time,	high	customs	
tariffs	successfully	impeded	access	for	imported	fuels	to	Ukraine.	
A	major	change	took	place	in	May	2005	on	the	Ukrainian	oil	market,	with	the	
arrival	 of	 the	 so-called	 fuel	 crisis.	 It	was	 provoked	 by	 the	 government’s	 at-
tempt	to	introduce	regulated	fuel	prices,	which	led	to	supplies	to	the	market	
being	withheld	by	the	main	producers,	i.e.	Ukrainian	refineries	controlled	by	
Russian	companies.	This,	 in	turn,	caused	diesel	oil	and	petrol	shortages.	The	
crisis	was	accompanied	by	a	dispute	between	the	government	led	by	Yulia	Ty-
moshenko	and	President	Viktor	Yushchenko	about	who	was	 responsible	 for	
the	situation.	As	a	result,	the	parliament,	wanting	to	‘stabilise	the	prices’,	de-
cided	to	lift	the	customs	duty	on	imports	of	petroleum	products.	
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Map. Main refineries and oil pipelines
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This	decision	had	a	 strong	adverse	 effect	 on	 the	Ukrainian	 refining	 industry.	
On	the	one	hand	it	boosted	competition	on	the	fuel	market,	which	positively	in-
fluenced	the	price	levels.	On	the	other,	it	resulted	in	a	gradual	increase	in	the	
quantities	of	foreign	fuels	on	the	Ukrainian	market,	undermining	the	financial	
standing	of	local	refineries.	They	were	forced	not	only	to	compete	with	imported	
products	but	also	to	look	for	funds	to	undergo	a	technological	modernisation.	Oil	
processing	output	at	Ukrainian	refineries	began	to	fall	rapidly	from	14.1	million	
tonnes	in	2006	to	10.5	million	tonnes	in	2008.	This	was	partly	an	effect	of	the	
decommissioning	of	the	technologically	obsolete	Kherson	refineries	followed	by	
the	closure	of	the	Drohobych	and	Nadvirna	refineries	(which	had	annual	nomi-
nal	processing	capacities	of	7	million	tonnes,	3.2	million	tonnes	and	2.6	million	
tonnes,	respectively).	Their	owners	were	either	unable	to	obtain	the	necessary	
funds	for	the	costly	modernisation	or	found	the	business	 insufficiently	prom-
ising,	given	the	need	to	compete	with	duty-free	 imported	fuel.	The	Ukrainian	
refineries	whose	depth	refining	is	only	around	55%	were	unable	to	produce	the	
higher-quality	fuel	(Euro	5)	which	was	becoming	increasingly	popular.	
In	2010,	LUKoil	decided	to	decommission	the	Odessa	refinery	(with	a	capacity	of	
2.8	million	tonnes)	in	response	to	the	decision	of	the	Ukrainian	state	oil	pipeline	
operator,	Ukrtransnafta,	to	withhold	supplies	of	crude	oil	from	Russia	to	the	re-
finery	via	the	Pridneprovsky	Main	Oil	Pipeline.	LUKoil	concluded	that	import-
ing	crude	oil	by	sea	was	economically	unfeasible.	The	decision	of	Ukrtransnafta,	
which	at	 that	 time	was	controlled	by	Privat	Group,	was	motivated	by	the	fact	
that	the	same	Privat	Group	two	years	earlier	had	illegally	(so-called	‘corporate	
raiding’)	 taken	control	of	Ukrtatnafta,	 the	company	supervising	the	Kremen-
chuk	refinery6.	As	a	result,	Russia	withheld	oil	supplies	to	this	company,	and	its	
new	owners	were	forced	to	import	the	raw	material	by	sea	due	to	the	reversal	of	
supplies	via	the	Pridneprovsky	Main	Oil	Pipeline.	This,	in	turn,	caused	the	need	
to	withhold	supplies	of	Russian	oil	via	this	route	to	LUKoil’s	refinery	in	Odessa7.	
The	Lysychansk	refinery	(with	a	capacity	of	7	million	tonnes)	was	also	closed	
in	March	2012	due	to	the	fact	that	production	was	unprofitable	(the	company	
is	at	present	owned	by	the	Russian	state-owned	company	Rosneft,	after	it	took	
6	 For	more	information	on	this	dispute	see:	W.	Konończuk,	W	Krzemieńczuku	na	Ukrainie…	
bitwa	o	rafinerię,	Gigawat	Energia,	no.	3/2008;	http://www.gigawat.net.pl/archiwum/in-
dex.php/article/articleview/1168/1/84/index.html
7	 Tatneft,	deprived	of	its	stake	in	Ukrtatnafta	by	Privat	Group,	sued	the	Ukrainian	state	at	an	
economic	court	in	Paris	which	ruled	in	2014	that	the	Ukrainian	state	should	pay	damages	of	
US$112	million	to	the	Russian	company.	In	November	2016,	this	verdict	was	upheld	by	an	ap-
pellate	court	in	Paris;	http://www.tatneft.ru/press-tsentr/press-relizi/more/4917/?lang=ru
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over	TNK-BP	in	2013).	At	the	same	time,	foreign	fuels	were	imported	on	a	mas-
sive	scale	to	Ukraine	and	excise	duty	evasion	methods	were	widely	used.	This	
was	possible	because	the	people	engaged	in	this	were	linked	to	Ukraine’s	sen-
ior	government	figures	(see	the	details	below).	Attempts	made	by	the	refinery	
owners	to	convince	the	government	to	impose	customs	duty	on	fuel	imports	
proved	unsuccessful.	
The	closure	of	the	Lysychansk	refinery	led	to	a	complete	cut	of	Russian	crude	
oil	supplies	to	Ukraine.	As	a	result,	for	five	years,	Kremenchuk	has	been	the	
only	refinery	in	operation	in	Ukraine,	processing	Ukrainian	oil	(domestic	pro-
duction	in	2016	reached	2.2	million	tonnes	and	is	regularly	falling)	and	small	
quantities	 of	 imported	 oil	 (mainly	 from	Azerbaijan	 and	Kazakhstan).	 Small	
quantities	 of	 fuel	 are	 also	produced	by	 the	Shebelinka	Gas	Processing	Plant	
owned	by	the	state-controlled	company	UkrGasVydobuvannya.	
Since	Ukraine	gained	independence,	Russia	has	been	the	key	source	of	oil	sup-
plies	and	for	many	years	it	had	no	competitors.	In	2006–2015,	as	much	as	89.4%	
of	 imported	oil	originated	from	Russia,	5.6%	from	Azerbaijan	and	4.4%	from	
Kazakhstan8.	It	is	also	worth	noting	that	the	two	latter	countries	began	sup-
plying	oil	only	in	the	past	few	years.	In	2016,	the	key	suppliers	of	crude	oil	to	
Ukraine	were	Kazakh	producers	(96.8%	of	total	supplies),	but	the	supplies	(via	
railroad	transport)	were	small,	reaching	around	400,000	tonnes.	
Chart 4. Crude oil imports to Ukraine (million tonnes)
2007 2008 200920062005 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 20160
3
6
9
12
15 [million tonnes]
Data: State Statistics Service of Ukraine
8	 O.	Мельник,	Нафта.	Стабільний	рух	в	нікуди?,	EIRCenter.com,	19	July	2016;	http://eir-
center.com/ua-analiitika/nafta-stabilnij-rux-v-nikudio/	
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As	a	result	of	the	processes	described	above,	oil	processing	in	Ukraine	has	re-
mained	at	a	 record-low	 level	of	around	2.5	million	 tonnes	annually.	 In	2015,	
the	share	of	domestic	fuels	in	total	Ukrainian	consumption	was	only	15%.	The	
remainder	is	imported.	
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III.  the Future oF the ukraInIan reFInInG 
sector
Ukraine’s	refining	sector	is	in	a	deep	crisis,	which	is	an	effect	of	various	fac-
tors:	many	years	of	negligence	by	the	owners	of	the	companies	who	failed	to	
take	timely	measures	to	modernise	them;	the	 lack	of	a	government	strategy	
for	 the	 development	 of	 the	 sector;	 and	 the	 impact	 of	 corruption,	 including	
high	 incomes	generated	by	 illegal	 fuel	 imports.	 In	effect,	Ukrainian	refiner-
ies	are	the	most	outdated	in	Europe,	and	only	one	of	the	six,	the	Kremenchuk	
refinery,	currently	produces	fuel.	The	Energy	Strategy	of	Ukraine	to	2030,	ap-
proved	in	2013,	envisaged	that	the	expenses	necessary	to	modernise	Ukraine’s	
“most	modern”	–	as	was	stated	in	the	document	–	refineries	are	at	the	level	of	
US$3.6–5.5	billion9.
The	 Kremenchuk	 refinery	 has	 a	 technical	 production	 capacity	 of	 10–11	million	
tonnes	annually.	This	means	that	theoretically	it	might	satisfy	a	significant	major-
ity	of	the	domestic	demand	for	fuel	(diesel	oil	and	petrol).	However,	insufficient	
raw	material	supplies	(partly	due	to	falling	oil	output	in	Ukraine)	and	modernisa-
tion	needs	are	a	problem.	The	refinery	is	unable	to	produce	top-quality	fuels	in	the	
quantities	demanded	by	the	market.	It	was	only	in	April	2016	that	the	Kremen-
chuk	refinery	began	producing	Euro	5	class	diesel	oil.	The	refinery’s	management	
has	made	efforts	to	import	larger	quantities	of	crude	oil.	In	November	2016,	the	
company	struck	a	deal	with	Azerbaijan	under	which	a	total	of	4	million	tonnes	
of	Azeri	Light	oil	will	be	supplied	within	a	timeframe	of	three	years;	a	supply	of	
around	1.3	million	tonnes	is	planned	in	2017.	The	oil	will	be	imported	via	the	Prid-
neprovsky	Main	Oil	 Pipeline	 connecting	Odessa	 and	Kremenchuk	 from	which	
Urals	oil	was	pumped	out	in	2016	and	replaced	with	Azeri	Light	oil.
Privat	Group	is	not	currently	planning	to	launch	a	comprehensive	programme	
for	 the	modernisation	 of	 the	 Kremenchuk	 refinery.	 It	will	 only	 take	 isolated	
measures	that	will	not	influence	the	technological	development	of	the	company	
as	a	whole.	The	estimated	minimum	investments	necessary	cost	around	one	bil-
lion	dollars.	The	current	modernisation	of	some	installations	is	expected	to	make	
it	possible	to	produce	2	million	tonnes	of	Euro	5	class	petrol	and	diesel	oil,	which	
would	only	satisfy	around	a	quarter	of	the	Ukrainian	demand	for	these	fuels10.	
9	 Оновлення	Енергетичної	стратегії	України	на	період	до	2030	р.,	11	June	2012;	http://mpe.
kmu.gov.ua/minugol/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=222022&cat_id=104126	
10	 Сергей	Куюн,	Осенние	“цыплята”	топливного	рынка,	Zerkalo Nedeli,	25	November	2016;	
http://gazeta.zn.ua/energy_market/osennie-cyplyata-toplivnogo-rynka-_.html
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The	present	situation	of	the	remaining	five	Ukrainian	refineries	is	much	worse.	
They	will	not	be	able	to	resume	operation	in	the	immediate	future:	
•	The	two	western	Ukrainian	refineries in Drohobych and Nadvirna	are	
so	technologically	outdated	that	they	would	have	to	be	built	from	scratch,	
which	would	require	investments	worth	at	least	one	billion	dollars	in	each	
case.	This	is	rather	unrealistic,	not	only	because	their	owner	(Privat	Group)	
has	not	shown	interest	in	them,	but	also	because	it	is	economically	unfeasi-
ble	to	have	two	refineries	operating	in	this	region	of	Ukraine.	
•	Over	the	past	few	years	attempts	have	been	made	to	reactivate	the	Kher-
son refinery which	 was	 bought	 in	 2007	by	 the	 Ukrainian	 Continium	
Group,	the	owner	of	the	WOG	filling	station	network.	It	was	estimated	then	
that	around	2	billion	dollars	of	investments	were	needed,	and	the	firm	was	
looking	for	sources	of	funds.	However,	since	the	death	of	its	main	owner,	
Ihor	Yeremeev,	in	2016,	the	project	seems	to	be	even	less	realistic.	
•	It	is	equally	unlikely	that	the	Lysychansk refinery (Luhansk	oblast)	will	
resume	operation.	The	refinery	might	produce	several	million	tonnes	of	fu-
els	(low	quality)	annually	without	any	major	investments.	However,	Ros-
neft	is	not	interested	in	putting	it	 into	operation;	this	is	obviously	partly	
due	to	the	fact	that	it	is	located	in	the	immediate	vicinity	of	the	front	line	in	
Donbas	(some	installations	of	the	refinery	were	damaged	during	previous	
military	operations).	
•	The	Odessa refinery is	also	unlikely	to	resume	production.	In	2013,	it	was	
bought	from	LUKoil	by	Serhiy	Kurchenko,	a	Ukrainian	oligarch	linked	to	the	
inner	circle	of	the	former	president,	Viktor	Yanukovych.	However,	Kurch-
enko	had	 to	flee	 the	Ukrainian	prosecution	 authorities	 due	 to	 charges	 of	
large-scale	corruption.	The	company’s	present	ownership	status	is	unclear.	
In	2014,	 the	refinery	was	 taken	over	by	 the	Russian	bank	VTB	as	a	secu-
rity	deposit	for	Kurchenko’s	unpaid	debts.	The	company’s	bankruptcy	pro-
cedure	was	launched	in	2016,	and	it	is	currently	managed	under	a	decision	
passed	by	the	Ukrainian	Ministry	of	Energy	by	the	state-owned	company	
Ukrtransnefteprodukt,	which	is	 in	fact	controlled	by	politicians	from	the	
People’s	Front,	the	party	of	the	former	prime	minister,	Arseniy	Yatsenyuk11.
11	 Вадим	Стародубцев,	Сумеет	ли	Путин	отстоять	Одесский	НПЗ,	Delovaya Stolitsa,	18	Jan-
uary	2016;	http://www.dsnews.ua/economics/borba-za-odesskiy-npz-dostigla-kulminat-
sii-18012016151600
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Another	Ukrainian	fuel	producer,	in	addition	to	the	Kremenchuk	refinery,	is	
the	Shebelinka Gas Processing Plant which	has	made	moves	over	the	past	
two	years	to	modernise	its	installations.	This	made	it	possible	to	launch	pro-
duction	of	small	quantities	of	Euro	5	standard	petrol.	The	company’s	present	
production	capacity	is	around	550,000	tonnes	of	fuel	annually.	However,	the	
availability	 of	 crude	 oil	 is	 a	 problem,	 and	 (in	 addition	 to	Ukrainian	 oil)	 the	
company	processes	small	quantities	of	oil	from	Kazakhstan.	
In	2016,	Ukrainian	oil	companies	produced	approximately	1.45	million	tonnes	
of	 fuels	 in	 total.	 In	 the	 case	of	 the	Kremenchuk	refinery,	 this	was	0.58	mil-
lion	tonnes	of	diesel	oil	(+12.7%	y/y)	and	0.6	million	tonnes	of	petrol	(+20%	y/y),	
while	in	the	case	of	the	Shebelinka	plant	this	was	0.11	million	tonnes	of	die-
sel	oil	(+7.5%	y/y)	and	0.16	million	tonnes	of	petrol	(-11.6%	y/y)12.	According	to	
Ukrainian	experts,	 if	modernisation	 is	 continued	and	crude	oil	 supplies	are	
ensured,	the	output	of	these	fuels	could	increase	to	6	million	tonnes	annually,	
above	all	owing	to	the	existing	capacity	of	the	Kremenchuk	refinery13.	
the future of the oil sector according to the Draft energy strategy 
of ukraine to 2035 
The Draft Energy Strategy of Ukraine to 2035 has been developed by the 
Ministry of Energy and Coal Mining in co-operation with the National In-
stitute of Strategic Studies and the private Ukrainian Centre for Economic 
and Political Studies named after Olexandr Razumkov14. The document 
was published on 19 December 2016 for further consultation. 
Relatively little space in the document is devoted to the oil sector. The 
strategy points out its main weaknesses, such as: the low technical level of 
Ukrainian refineries; the difficult financial situation; the lack of a strategic 
approach from the state; the ineffective regulatory, fiscal and tariff policy; 
the non-transparency of the fuel market; the absence of stimuli for mod-
ernisation (fiscal and in the form of penalties). In fact, this is the diagnosis 
12	 Иван	Кудинов,	Александр	Сиренко,	Рынок	ДТ	—	2016:	сравняли	качество	до	5,	Nef-
terynok.info,	23.01.2017;	http://www.nefterynok.info/analytics.phtml?art_id=390;	Иван	
Кудинов,	Рынок	бензинов	2016:	не	все	потеряно,	Nefterynok.info,	16	January	2017;	http://
www.nefterynok.info/analytics.phtml?art_id=389
13	 Сергей	Куюн,	Евгений	Мочалов.	Качество	ждет	объемов,	Zerkalo Nedeli,	10	September	
2016;	http://gazeta.zn.ua/energy_market/kachestvo-zhdet-obemov-_.html
14	 http://mpe.kmu.gov.ua/minugol/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=245165746&cat_
id=245165726	
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of a serious collapse. The document also criticises the approach of the pre-
vious governments who were too hasty in concluding that investors would 
guarantee sufficient quantities of crude oil to be processed at Ukrainian 
refineries. The strategy also concludes that for more than twenty years the 
state has failed to adopt a single document of a strategic nature that would 
set the sector’s development goals. The most recent one was the develop-
ment programme for the refining industry adopted in 1993. This, though, 
has not been implemented. 
The strategy formulates the following main goals for the development of 
the refining sector: 
•	 modernisation	 of	 Ukraine’s	 refineries	 (including	 the	 construction	 of	
a	new	plant)	and	the	adoption	of	an	adequate	governmental	programme	
to	stimulate	the	process;	
•	 increasing	the	depth	of	crude	oil	processing	to	the	level	of	80–85%,	which	
was	recognised	as	the	“top	priority	in	the	development	of	the	refineries”;
•	 bringing	about	changes	in	the	fuel	consumption	structure	by	reducing	
the	demand	for	low-grade	petrols	and	increasing	that	for	higher-quality	
fuels;
•	 	creating	a	competitive	petroleum	product	market;
•	 the	rapid	development	of	the	Ukrainian	chemical	industry;
•	 maintaining	state	control	of	the	oil	pipeline	system;
•	 causing	an	increase	in	the	state’s	own	oil	resources	to	over	150	million	
tonnes	in	2030	by	stimulating	exploration	and	extraction;
•	 maintaining	the	share	of	petroleum	products	in	the	energy	balance	at	
12.1%	in	2020,	10.3%	in	2025,	8.8%	in	2030	and	7.3%	in	2035.	
The strategy envisages achieving these goals in three stages: 
1.	 in 2017–2020, adopting	the	governmental	programme	for	the	moderni-
sation	of	 the	 refining	 industry,	 a	 gradual	 improvement	 of	 the	quality	
of	 the	 fuels	produced,	 creating	 a	 90-day	 reserve	of	 oil	 and	petroleum	
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	products,	“perfecting	the	operation	of	the	petroleum	products	market,	
including	 creating	 conditions	 for	 the	 influx	 of	 foreign	 oil	 extracting	
firms	and	for	building	a	modern	refinery	in	Ukraine”;	
2.	 in 2021–2025,	 creating	 conditions	 to	 ensure	 oil	 supplies	 via	pipelines	
from	various	directions,	 leading	 to	 increasing	oil	 processing	depth	 to	
the	level	of	75%,	ensuring	supplies	of	fuels	produced	in	Ukraine	up	to	the	
level	of	30%	domestic	demand,	while	limiting	fuel	supply	imports	from	
any	single	direction	to	30%	of	total	imports;
3.	 in 2026–2035,	ensuring	a	50%	share	of	Ukrainian	production	in	the	fuel	
market	and	improving	fuel	quality	to	the	Euro-5	level,	making	Ukraine	
part	 of	 international	 extraction	 projects,	 ensuring	 that	 the	 share	 of	
crude	oil	supplied	from	a	single	direction	does	not	exceed	30%.
The main problem of the strategy to 2035 is the vague character of most 
of its provisions, including the one concerning declared state support, 
and the lack of a mechanism that would lead to the modernisation of the 
Ukrainian refining sector. As a result, it is difficult to recognise this docu-
ment as a real ‘signpost’ for the refining industry’s reform. It is rather a set 
of proposals without a clearly determined way as to how they could be put 
into practice. The strategy has also been criticised by numerous Ukrainian 
experts and by the European Commission which stated that it was overly 
optimistic and failed to take into account the potential risks15.
15	 ЄК	розкритикувала	проект	«Енергетична	стратегія	України	до	2035	року»,	Interfax,	
20	January	2017;	http://ua.interfax.com.ua/news/general/397840.html	
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IV. oIl extractIon In ukraIne
Ukraine’s	 estimated	 oil	 reserves	 range	 between	 63	million	 tonnes	 (experts’	
estimates)	 and	 137	million	 tonnes	 (Naftogaz’s	 estimates)16.	 Until	 recently,	
Ukraine’s	own	oil	output	was	around	4.5	million	tonnes	annually	and	was	pro-
cessed	by	Ukrainian	 refineries.	The	 fuels	made	 from	 it	 satisfied	around	one	
fifth	of	domestic	demand.	However,	over	the	past	few	years,	oil	extraction	has	
been	falling	rapidly	as	a	result	of	the	depletion	of	the	oil	fields	in	use	and	an	
insufficient	 level	 of	 investments.	The	 level	 of	 oil	production	was	 reduced	by	
45%	between	2009	and	2016	and	forecasts	indicate	that	it	will	continue	to	fall.	
Chart 5. Oil and gas condensate extraction in Ukraine (million tonnes) 
UkrGasVydobuvannya
2009 2010 2011
Ukrnafta
UkrGasVydobuvannya
other
2012 2013 2014 2015 20160.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0 [million tonnes]
Data: Ministry of Energy and Coal Mining 
Ukrnafta	and	UkrGasVydobuvannya	are	Ukraine’s	 largest	oil	producers.	To-
gether	they	account	for	around	90%	of	domestic	oil	extraction.	In	the	case	of	
Ukrnafta,	the	state	controls	50%	plus	one	share,	while	UkrGasVydobuvannya	
is	100%	state-owned	(both	companies	are	part	of	the	Naftogaz	structure).	The	
remaining	volume	of	oil	is	extracted	in	small	quantities	by	around	twenty	pri-
vate	gas	firms	during	natural	gas	extraction.	
16	 O.	Мельник,	Нафта.	Стабільний	рух	в	нікуди?,	EIRCenter.com,	19	July	2016;	http://eir-
center.com/ua-analiitika/nafta-stabilnij-rux-v-nikudio/	
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1. the situation of ukrnafta
Ukrnafta	has	been	running	at	low	efficiency	for	over	ten	years	now	due	to	the	
fact	that	the	state	has	in	fact	lost	control	of	the	company.	In	2003,	management	
of	this	firm	was	entrusted	to	Privat	Group,	which	controls	42%	of	its	shares.	
This	was	a	result	of	informal	political	deals	between	the	then	inner	circle	of	
President	Leonid	Kuchma	and	the	oligarch	Ihor	Kolomoyskyi	who	controls	Pri-
vat	Group.	Kolomoyskyi	has	been	able	to	find	common	ground	with	all	subse-
quent	Ukrainian	governments:	in	the	period	following	the	Orange	Revolution,	
during	the	presidency	of	Viktor	Yanukovych,	and	after	the	Revolution	of	Dig-
nity.	The	informal	price	Privat	has	paid	for	maintaining	control	of	Ukrnafta	
is	the	need	to	pay	bribes	to	members	of	the	government	and	support	them	in	
Kolomoyskyi’s	media	(in	particular,	TV	1+1,	one	of	Ukraine’s	most	popular	TV	
channels).	Furthermore,	the	provisions	of	the	Joint-Stock	Companies	Act	im-
posing	the	requirement	to	obtain	consent	from	60%	of	shareholders	to	convene	
a	general	assembly	meeting	have	made	it	difficult	for	the	state	to	regain	con-
trol	of	the	company.	This	meant	that	the	Treasury	was	unable	to	expedite	the	
nomination	of	 the	supervisory	board	without	consulting	Privat.	As	a	result,	
the	structures	controlled	by	Ihor	Kolomoyskyi	have	been	siphoning	off	money	
from	the	company	on	a	massive	scale	for	more	than	ten	years.	The	total	output	
of	oil	extracted	by	Ukrnafta	was	supplied	to	the	Kremenchuk	refinery	owned	
by	Privat	(the	company	additionally	produced	around	2–3	million	m3	of	natu-
ral	gas	annually).	Overexploitation	of	 the	company,	 the	 lack	of	 investments,	
and	numerous	corruption	schemes	led	to	a	significant	decrease	in	oil	and	gas	
output	by	around	40%	and	35%	respectively	in	a	few	years17.	In	2016	alone,	oil	
production	fell	by	9.2%.
After	the	Maidan	revolution,	 the	new	government	entered	into	a	tactical	al-
liance	 with	 Kolomoyskyi,	 who	 was	 nominated	 governor	 of	 Dnipropetrovsk	
Oblast	in	March	2014.	As	Donbas	was	facing	the	risk	of	war,	he	was	capable	of	
stabilising	this	oblast.	Following	his	dismissal	 in	March	2015,	Kyiv	made	an	
attempt	to	regain	control	of	Ukrnafta.	In	April	2015,	the	Verkhovna	Rada	(the	
Ukrainian	parliament)	brought	about	an	amendment	of	the	Joint-Stock	Com-
panies	Act	and	introduced	regulations	reducing	the	quorum	necessary	to	con-
vene	the	supervisory	board	to	50%	of	shareholders’	votes.	This	opened	up	the	
way	to	replacing	the	board	of	directors	of	Ukrnafta	who	had	been	completely	
subordinated	to	Privat.	Mark	Rollins	from	the	United	Kingdom	was	nominated	
17	 C.	Куюн,	Нефть	в	обмен	на...	телевизор,	Zerkalo Nedeli,	18	March	2016;	http://gazeta.zn.ua/
internal/neft-v-obmen-na-televizor-_.html	
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
24
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
4/
20
17
the	new	CEO	of	the	company.	However,	it	soon	turned	out	that	Privat	had	main-
tained	 operational	 control	 of	 Ukrnafta.	 Furthermore,	 the	 siphoning	 off	 of	
funds	from	the	firm	also	intensified	(for	example,	petroleum	products	worth	
around	US$280	million	were	sold	to	an	unknown	firm	(a	money	mule)	but	it	is	
obliged	to	pay	in	two	years).	
As	a	result,	in	2016,	Ukrnafta	sustained	a	loss	of	US$250	million,	and	the	debt	
it	owed	to	the	state	reached	around	US$470	million	(mainly	due	to	outstanding	
taxes),	which	means	that	the	firm	has	found	itself	on	the	verge	of	bankruptcy18.	
Although	the	Ukrainian	media	had	reported	on	the	situation	in	the	company	
for	many	months	(this	was	also	confirmed	by	a	PWC	audit	revealed	in	October	
2016),	neither	the	management	of	Naftogaz	nor	the	government	did	anything	to	
improve	the	situation.	Everything	seems	to	suggest	that	this	is	a	consequence	
of	the	still	binding	deal	between	Kolomoyskyi	and	a	section	of	the	government	
elite.	The	People’s	Front,	a	member	of	the	government	coalition,	had	previously	
lobbied	for	Kolomoyskyi’s	interests,	for	example,	by	blocking	the	amendments	
to	the	Joint-Stock	Companies	Act.	Andriy	Kobolyev,	the	CEO	of	Naftogaz,	is	the	
chairman	 of	 the	 supervisory	 board	 of	Ukrnafta	 (he	has	 political	 links	with	
Arseniy	Yatsenyuk’s	party).	He	might	have	blocked	the	schemes	to	siphon	off	
large	amounts	of	money	from	the	company	in	2014–2016,	but	he	turned	a	blind	
eye	to	this	for	some	reason19.
2. the situation of ukrGasVydobuvannya
UkrGasVydobuvannya	has	also	been	a	political	piggy	bank	for	subsequent	gov-
ernment	elites	over	the	past	 few	years.	After	2010,	 the	management	of	Ukr-
GasVydobuvannya	 (which	 is	 one	 of	Ukraine’s	 largest	 and	 richest	 companies	
producing	around	15	billion	m3	of	natural	gas	annually)	was	entrusted	to	oli-
garch	Dmytro	Firtash.	According	to	 information	from	the	Ukrainian	media,	
he	won	an	informal	 ‘tender’	by	paying	one	billion	dollars	to	 the	 inner	circle	
of	President	Yanukovych20.	A	gas	market	reform	was	 initiated	following	the	
Revolution	 of	 Dignity	 in	 Ukraine.	 It	 envisages,	 for	 example,	 unbundling	 of	
18	 Аудит	„зради”,	Zerkalo Nedeli,	1	October	2016;	http://zn.ua/columnists/audit-zradi-225939_.
html
19	 For	more	information	see:	C.	Куюн,	Преступление	и	наказание	по	Черчиллю,	Zerkalo Ne-
deli,	10	March	2017;	http://gazeta.zn.ua/energy_market/prestuplenie-i-nakazanie-po-cher-
chillyu-_.html
20	 C.	Куюн,	Пора	вернуть	нефтегазовую	отрасль	Украине,	Zerkalo Nedeli,	28	February	
2014;	http://gazeta.zn.ua/energy_market/pora-vernut-neftegazovuyu-otrasl-ukraine-_.html
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Naftogaz	and	excluding	UkrGasVydobuvannya	from	its	structures.	In	addition	
to	this,	the	company’s	board	of	directors	has	been	changed,	and	the	company	
has	adopted	a	new	strategy,	which	offers	the	chance	for	a	rapid	improvement	
of	its	operation	and	an	increase	in	its	output.	
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V. Fuel Imports to ukraIne
As	the	Ukrainian	refineries	limited	production	and	some	of	them	were	decom-
missioned,	this	gave	rise	to	an	increase	in	fuel	imports.	While	until	2005	the	
share	of	imported	petrol	and	diesel	oil	in	total	consumption	did	not	exceed	8%,	
it	subsequently	began	to	rise	rapidly.	One	factor	which	contributed	to	this	was	
the	unfortunate	decision	made	by	the	government	in	Kyiv	in	2005	to	lift	cus-
toms	duty	on	imported	petroleum	products	which	led	to	a	gradual	degradation	
and	closures	of	Ukrainian	refineries	which	were	unable	to	compete	with	for-
eign	production.	Their	lack	of	competitiveness	was	also	an	effect	of	the	owners’	
failure	to	modernise	their	companies.	
In	the	first	years	after	the	decision	to	lift	the	customs	duty,	the	share	of	im-
ported	 fuels	 in	 total	consumption	rose	several	 times.	2011	was	 the	first	year	
when	more	fuel	was	imported	than	produced	at	Ukrainian	refineries	(62%	ver-
sus	38%).	The	government	in	Kyiv	was	seriously	considering	the	option	of	rein-
troducing	import	duty	at	that	time.	However,	the	lobbying	of	the	political	and	
business	groups	which	controlled	a	significant	section	of	imports	won.	
In	 the	next	years,	 the	upward	 trend	 in	 imports	 further	 intensified.	 In	2012,	
imported	fuels	had	a	75%	share	in	the	Ukrainian	market,	in	2014	it	rose	to	81%,	
and	in	2015	to	85%.	The	share	of	imports	versus	domestic	production	was	lower	
in	the	case	of	petrol	(70%	and	30%	respectively)	and	higher	in	the	case	of	diesel	
oil	(90%	and	10%	respectively).	Ukraine	is	the	only	European	country	of	this	
size	to	have	such	a	low	share	of	own	production	in	total	fuel	consumption.	
Chart 6. Petrol and diesel oil production in Ukraine compared to imports of 
these fuels (%)
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production imports
Data: IEA, State Statistics Service of Ukraine
Ukrainian	companies	are	also	unable	to	produce	sufficient	quantities	of	LPG	to	
satisfy	the	rapidly	growing	domestic	demand.	Therefore,	increasing	quantities	
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of	this	fuel	are	imported.	While	in	2008	96.1%	of	LPG	was	produced	in	Ukraine,	
in	2012	this	share	fell	to	62.7%,	in	2014	to	46.9%,	and	in	2016	to	27.1%21.
1. the directions of fuel imports
Ukrainian	fuel	imports	are	well-diversified.	The	largest	suppliers	over	the	past	
few	years	have	been:	Belarus,	Russia,	Lithuania	and	Poland.	However,	 their	
share	differs	depending	on	the	kind	of	fuel.	
Imported	diesel	oil	accounted	for	as	much	as	88%	of	diesel	oil	consumption	in	
Ukraine	in	2016,	reaching	almost	5.2	million	tonnes	(+7.1%	when	compared	to	
2015).	Belarus,	whose	share	reaches	almost	half	of	all	supplies,	has	been	a	key	
supplier	for	a	few	years.	Supplies	from	Russia	account	for	over	one	fifth	of	the	
imports,	and	those	from	Lithuania	for	around	10%.	Ukraine’s	industry	and	ag-
riculture,	one	of	the	pillars	of	the	Ukrainian	economy	generating	the	largest	
share	in	exports,	are	the	main	consumers	of	diesel	oil.	The	structure	of	imports	
of	this	fuel	in	2016	was	the	following:	75.9%	was	imported	by	rail,	13.7%	by	the	
product	oil	pipeline,	10.1%	by	tankers	and	0.3%	by	road	transport.	
Chart 7. The directions of diesel oil imports to Ukraine (% of total imports)
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Data: Nefterynok.info22
21	 Рынок	LPG-2016:	без	передышки,	Nefterynok,	6	February	2017;	http://www.nefterynok.
info/analytics.phtml?art_id=393	
22	 Иван	Кудинов,	Александр	Сиренко,	Рынок	ДТ	—	2016:	сравняли	качество	до	5,	Neft-
erynok.info,	23	January	2017;	http://www.nefterynok.info/analytics.phtml?art_id=390	
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In	2016,	imports	satisfied	66%	of	total	petrol	consumption	in	Ukraine,	reaching	
1.45	million	tonnes	(+4%	when	compared	to	2015).	Belarus	is	the	dominant	sup-
plier	of	this	fuel	to	Ukraine.	Its	share	in	2016	grew	to	a	record-high	level	of	80.3%	
of	total	imports.	Supplies	from	Lithuania	and	Poland	(the	refineries	owned	by	
PKN	Orlen)	had	a	share	of	11.3%	and	3.9%,	respectively.	As	can	be	seen,	the	three	
countries	in	aggregate	had	a	share	of	over	95%	in	total	petrol	imports.	The	supply	
structure	was	as	follows:	92	petrol	(54.4%),	95	petrol	(45.2%)	and	98	petrol	(0.4%).
Chart 8. The directions of petrol imports to Ukraine (% of total imports)
Belarus
Russia
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Poland
Bulgaria
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Data: Nefterynok.info23
The	companies	which	operate	filling	station	networks	are	among	the	 largest	
fuel	importers	to	Ukraine.	The	two	key	ones,	WOG	and	Okko,	accounted	in	ag-
gregate	for	34%	of	total	petrol	imports	in	2014	and	31%	in	2015.	Belarus’s	BNK,	
operating	through	its	Ukrainian	subsidiary	BNK-Ukraine,	is	also	a	large	im-
porter;	in	2015,	it	had	an	18.3%	share	in	the	petrol	market.	
1.1. Fuel supplies from Belarus
Belarusian	 producers	 have	 been	 gradually	 increasing	 their	 share	 in	 the	
Ukrainian	fuel	market	for	years.,	They	have	also	the	largest	suppliers	of	both	
petrol	and	diesel	oil	for	years.	Belarus’s	advantage	over	competitors	is	an	effect	
above	all	of	its	geographic	proximity.	The	Mozyr	refinery	(processing	capacity	
of	12	million	tonnes	of	oil	annually),	i.e.	the	key	Belarusian	supplier	to	Ukraine	
(over	90%	of	all	supplies	from	Belarus;	the	remaining	supplies	are	affected	by	
23	 Иван	Кудинов,	Рынок	бензинов	2016:	не	все	потеряно,	Nefterynok.info,	16	January	2017;	
http://www.nefterynok.info/analytics.phtml?art_id=389
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the	Polatsk-based	refinery	Naftan),	is	located	close	to	the	Belarusian-Ukrain-
ian	border.	The	modernisation	process	it	underwent	in	the	past	few	years	has	
enabled	it	to	sell	good-quality	fuel	at	a	moderate	price.	
Belarusians	have	also	developed	their	own	sales	network	on	the	Ukrainian	market,	
above	all	through	the	Ukrainian	subsidiary	of	the	Belarusian	Oil	Company	(BNK),	
which	was	established	by	Belarusian	refineries	and	the	state-owned	company	Be-
lorusneft.	Over	the	past	five	years,	the	level	of	fuel	sales	from	Belarus	has	been	at	
a	level	of	3–4	million	tonnes	annually,	and	diesel	oil	has	the	greater	share	in	this.	
In	 2016,	 Belarusian	 fuel	 exports	 to	Ukraine	 increased	 to	 4.1	million	 tonnes,	
while	petrol	supplies	grew	by	65%,	and	diesel	oil	supplies	by	24%	when	com-
pared	to	the	preceding	year.	The	share	of	 fuels	supplied	from	Belarus	 in	the	
total	Ukrainian	market	thus	reached	almost	50%.
Chart 9. Fuel supplies from Belarus to Ukraine (million tonnes)
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Data: Ministry of Energy and Coal Mining
In	2016,	the	share	of	Belarusian	supplies	in	the	sales	of	various	types	of	fuel	in	
Ukraine	grew	to	53%	of	the	total	petrol	market	and	over	47%	of	the	diesel	oil	
market.	Meanwhile,	the	share	of	Belarusian	LPG	sales	fell	to	15%.	It	is	worth	
noting	than	more	than	half	of	the	petrol	imported	from	Belarus	is	92	petrol.	
The	demand	for	it	results	from	the	fact	that	Ukrainian	wholesale	buyers	enrich	
it	with	various	components,	thus	‘upgrading’	it	to	the	level	of	95	petrol. 
Belarus	 is	 also	 the	number	one	 supplier	 of	mazut,	which	 is	mainly	used	by	
Ukrainian	thermal	power	plants	and	for	bitumen,	which	is	important	consid-
ering	the	activation	of	the	Ukrainian	road	repair	programme.	
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Chart 10. The share of fuels imported from Belarus in the Ukrainian market (%)
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Data: Nefterynok.info 
There	is	also	large	potential	in	Belarusian-Ukrainian	co-operation	as	regards	
crude	 oil	 supplies	 to	 Belarusian	 refineries	 from	 non-Russian	 sources.	 The	
Odessa–Brody	oil	 pipeline	 and	 then	 the	 southern	 section	of	 the	Druzhba	oil	
pipeline	may	become	an	alternative	route	of	crude	oil	supplies	to	Belarus.	
1.2. Fuel supplies from Russia
In	 the	first	years	after	Ukraine	 lifted	the	 import	duties	on	fuels,	Russia	was	
a	medium-size	supplier,	with	a	share	of	around	10%	of	diesel	oil	supplies	and	
several	times	less	petrol	supplies.	Imports	of	Russian	diesel	oil	significantly	in-
creased	recently,	remaining	at	around	25%	over	the	past	five	years.	At	the	time	
of	Viktor	Yanukovych’s	presidency,	 this	 increase	resulted	from	the	fact	 that	
part	of	the	market	had	been	taken	over	by	‘the	family’,	i.e.	his	inner	business	
circle,	 in	 particular	 Serhiy	 Kurchenko’s	 firms	 (for	 example,	 VETEK)	which	
imported	diesel	oil	from	Russia.	In	2015,	Russian	companies	sold	1.75	million	
tonnes	of	petroleum	products	in	Ukraine,	including	1.2	million	tonnes	of	diesel	
oil.	Russia’s	position	was	 temporarily	harmed	by	Moscow’s	 embargo	on	 fuel	
exports	to	Ukraine	that	was	in	force	between	October	2015	and	March	2016.	
There	was	a	discussion	in	Ukraine	in	spring	2016	initiated	by	the	then	Prime	
Minister	Arseniy	Yatsenyuk	whether	it	was	reasonable	to	ban	imports	of	Rus-
sian	fuels.	Finally,	 this	option	was	rejected	–	officially	because	of	 the	risk	of	
fuel	prices	on	the	Ukrainian	market	rising	significantly,	unofficially	because	
of	the	participation	of	people	linked	to	government	members	in	fuel	imports	
from	Russia.	
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As	a	result,	Russian	producers	returned	to	the	Ukrainian	market	in	2016,	sell-
ing	1.2	million	tonnes	of	diesel	oil	and	0.1	million	tonnes	of	petrol.	Fuels	from	
Russia	thus	had	a	16%	share	in	total	fuel	sales.	The	share	of	Russian	fuels	may	
grow	further	as	a	consequence	of	 the	reactivation	of	 the	product	oil	pipeline	
running	from	Russia	to	Ukraine	 in	 June	2016.	Since	that	time,	 this	route	has	
been	used	to	supply	150,000	–	180,000	tonnes	of	diesel	oil	(Euro	5)	monthly	to	
Ukraine.	Furthermore,	it	costs	US$20–25	less	per	tonne	when	compared	to	sup-
plies	by	rail.	This	means	that,	if	the	present	level	of	supplies	is	maintained,	the	
share	of	Russian	fuel	may	increase	to	50%	on	the	Ukrainian	diesel	oil	market.	
the product oil pipeline from russia
After the collapse of the USSR, the ownership of the product oil pipelines 
running from Ukraine was transferred not to Ukraine (unlike with the 
Ukrainian section of the Druzhba oil pipeline) but to Transneft, the Russian 
state-owned monopoly. The most important asset was the Samara–West Di-
rection product oil pipeline, with an annual transport capacity of 3.5 mil-
lion tonnes and a length of 1,433 km, connecting the Russian-Ukrainian 
border with the Ukrainian-Hungarian border, which is managed by a com-
pany named PrykarpatZapadTrans. However, in 2011, a Ukrainian court 
transferred the ownership of this pipeline to the Ukrainian Treasury, and 
this was confirmed by a decision passed by the Ukrainian Supreme Eco-
nomic Court in March 2015. Unexpectedly, the decision was cancelled by 
a court in Rivne, at the same time transferring the ownership of the prod-
uct oil pipeline to the Russian company. In August 2015, Transneft sold the 
pipeline to Switzerland’s International Trading Partners AG, and in De-
cember 2015 the Ukrainian Anti-Trust Committee approved this deal and it 
was finally signed in March 2016. 
It is unclear why, during a Russian-Ukrainian war, the government in Kyiv 
in fact allowed Russia to take over control of the strategic transport infra-
structure and then to sell it to a money mule from Switzerland. Further-
more, according to information from the Ukrainian press, International 
Trading Partners AG is most likely controlled by Viktor Medvedchuk, 
a Ukrainian politician who is reputed to be an important lobbyist of Rus-
sian interests in Ukraine. 
Russia	is	also	a	major	LPG	supplier	to	the	Ukrainian	market.	In	2016,	supplies	
reached	 almost	 0.8	million	 tonnes,	which	 ensured	 a	 54%	 share	 in	 the	 sales	
for	 Russian	 LPG	 in	 Ukraine.	 For	 Russian	 and	 Belarusian	 producers,	 this	 is	
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a	natural	territory	for	expansion,	given	the	geographic	proximity	and	the	cost-
effectiveness	of	exports.	
The	growing	share	of	LPG	in	total	fuel	sales	in	Ukraine	has	made	the	govern-
ment	more	interested	in	controlling	this	segment	of	imports	and	the	market.	
Unexpectedly,	towards	the	end	of	2016,	the	Security	Service	of	Ukraine	(SBU)	
accused	more	than	ten	firms	importing	fuel	from	Russia	of	‘financing	terror-
ism’	and	arrested	part	of	the	cisterns	with	LPG	at	the	border	checkpoint.	Eve-
rything	seems	to	indicate	that	this	move	was	aimed	at	eliminating	some	firms	
which	 in	aggregate	control	around	40%	of	 the	market.	This	case	was	widely	
publicised	by	the	Ukrainian	media	and	the	companies	themselves,	who	found	
the	SBU’s	actions	groundless	and	illegitimate.	As	a	result,	most	of	the	charges	
were	withdrawn.	However,	 everything	 suggests	 that	 this	 operation	was	 in-
tended	at	replacing	part	of	the	present	importers	with	firms	which	have	con-
nections	with	the	representatives	of	the	present	government,	most	probably	
including–	according	to	a	Ukrainian	media	report	–	President	Petro	Poroshen-
ko	and	Viktor	Medvedchuk24.
1.3. Fuel supplies from Lithuania and Poland
The	products	of	refineries	owned	by	PKN	Orlen,	the	Mažeikiai	refinery	in	Lith-
uania	and	the	Płock	refinery	in	Poland	supply	high-quality	fuel	and	have	had	
a	strong	position	on	the	Ukrainian	fuel	market	for	years.	Their	total	share	in	
the	Ukrainian	market	in	the	record-breaking	year	2015	reached	around	35%	of	
petrol	sales	and	over	15%	of	diesel	oil	sales.	As	a	result,	they	became	one	of	the	
top	three	foreign	fuel	suppliers	to	the	Ukrainian	market.
Over	 the	 past	 few	 years	 the	 share	 of	 Lithuanian	 fuels	 has	 been	 growing	 at	
a	regular	rate	–	from	9%	of	total	 imports	in	2009	to	around	12%	in	2011.	It	 is	
worth	noting	that	Orlen	Lietuva	has	a	particularly	strong	position	on	the	pet-
rol	market	(in	2014–2015,	its	share	reached	20–26%	of	total	imports)	and	has	
increased	its	share	in	the	diesel	oil	market	from	3%	of	total	imports	in	2012	to	
almost	10%	in	2015.	In	2016,	the	sale	of	Lithuanian	petrol	fell	to	11.3%	of	total	
imports,	while	that	of	diesel	oil	increased	to	10.7%.
Poland	also	increased	its	share	in	the	Ukrainian	market	by	2015	–	in	the	case	
of	petrol	from	6%	in	2012	to	15%	of	imports	in	2015,	and	in	the	case	of	diesel	oil	
24	 P.	Иванченко	Газ	со	вкусом	шоколада,	Zerkalo Nedeli,	24	February	2017;	http://gazeta.
zn.ua/energy_market/gaz-so-vkusom-shokolada-_.html
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from	less	than	1%	to	6%	of	imports	in	the	same	timeframe.	However,	in	2016,	
the	share	of	the	Płock	refinery	fell	to	3.9%	of	petrol	imports	and	to	2.1%	of	die-
sel	oil	imports	due	to	a	more	than	ten	per	cent	increase	in	fuel	consumption	in	
Poland	(which	was	an	effect	of	successfully	combating	the	grey	economy)	and	
competition	from	Russian	and	Belarusian	fuels.	
Chart 11. The share (%) of supplies from Poland and Lithuania in imports of 
petrol and diesel oil 
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Data: Consulting Group A-95 
1.4. Other foreign suppliers
The	suppliers	 that	have	 traditionally	had	a	 significant	 share	 in	 the	Ukrain-
ian	fuel	market	include	Greece,	Israel	and	Romania,	which	each	have	a	share	
of	several	per	cent	in	total	sales.	Petrol	from	Romania	until	recently	had	the	
strongest	position.	In	2014,	its	share	in	imports	reached	16.6%,	but	in	2016	it	
fell	to	1.4%.	This	happened	as	a	result	of	the	decision	made	by	the	Romanian	
company	Rompetrol	(which	is	controlled	by	Kazakhstan’s	KazMunayGas)	to	
withdraw	from	Ukrainian	market	and	also	as	a	result	of	the	sale	of	the	net-
work	of	Ukrainian	filling	stations	by	LUKoil	which	supplied	part	of	 its	 fuel	
from	Romania.	
2. the costs of fuel imports
The	 regularly	 growing	 share	 of	 foreign	 fuels	 in	 Ukrainian	 consumption	
has	 caused	 foreign	 petroleum	 products	 to	 have	 a	 very	 important	 position	
in	 Ukrainian	 imports.	 For	 years,	 fuel	 imports	 have	 had	 the	 second	 largest	
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financial	value	(after	natural	gas).	While	in	2009	the	costs	of	imported	fuels	
were	at	US$2.8	billion,	in	2012	they	had	already	moved	up	to	US$8.8	billion.	In	
2015	and	2016	expenses	on	foreign	petroleum	products	fell	to	US$3.85	billion	
and	US$3.3.	billion	respectively,	which	was	an	effect	of	falling	oil	prices.	
Chart 12. The value of fuel imports to Ukraine (US$ billion)
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Data: Ukraine’s State Tax Service
The	share	of	fuels	in	total	Ukrainian	imports	rose	from	6%	in	2009	to	a	maxi-
mum	level	of	12.3%	in	2014	to	finally	fall	back	to	8.7%	in	2016.	Thus	one	con-
sequence	of	the	deep	crisis	of	the	Ukrainian	refining	industry	is	the	need	to	
import	fuels	from	other	countries,	which	worsens	Ukraine’s	trade	deficit.	
Chart 13. Import of fuels to Ukraine as a % of total imports
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Data: State Statistics Service of Ukraine
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VI. the Grey Fuel economy
It	is	impossible	to	understand	the	situation	in	the	Ukrainian	oil	sector	with-
out	taking	into	account	the	significance	of	the	schemes	of	illegal	fuel	imports	
which	have	been	 functioning	 for	more	 than	 ten	years	 and	 the	 fuel	 fraud	 in	
Ukraine.	Although	the	scale	of	this	phenomenon	is	difficult	to	determine	pre-
cisely,	it	certainly	covers	a	very	important	part	of	the	market.	The	likely	size	
of	the	grey	economy,	i.e.	the	share	of	illegal	fuel	in	total	consumption	(i.e.	fuel	
without	excise	duty,	fuel	which	fails	to	meet	standards	and	fuel	from	unreg-
istered	imports),	is	around	20–25%	of	the	market.	The	scale	and	the	resulting	
cost-effectiveness	 of	 this	kind	of	 trade	 and	 the	 real	 patronage	 from	govern-
ment	representatives	were	among	the	major	factors	which	have	influenced	the	
present	situation	of	the	Ukrainian	fuel	sector.	
Illegal	fuel	imports	to	Ukraine	gained	momentum	after	2005	when	the	govern-
ment	decided	to	lift	import	duty	on	petroleum	products.	This	led	to	the	estab-
lishment	of	many	firms	engaged	in	importing	fuels	and	often	evading	taxes.	The	
scale	of	this	phenomenon	was	proportionate	to	the	decline	in	the	output	of	the	
Ukrainian	refineries.	One	of	the	reasons	why	subsequent	refineries	were	closed	
was	their	inability	to	match	their	competitors	who	were	selling	cheap	fuel.	
One	of	the	largest	firms	operating	on	the	market	over	the	past	few	years	was	
Livela,	a	subsidiary	of	the	Ukrainian-Polish	firm	Taystra	(little	is	known	about	
its	 operation).	 Livela	was	given	 the	unprecedented	privilege	of	 tax-free	 fuel	
import	and	its	operation	reached	its	peak	in	201025.	At	that	time	the	company’s	
exclusive	right	was	confirmed	by	the	Supreme	Administrative	Court;	this	was	
viewed	as	a	political	decision.	As	a	result,	in	just	a	few	months	it	legally	import-
ed	thousands	of	tonnes	of	fuels	without	the	need	to	pay	customs	duty.	The	esti-
mated	losses	sustained	by	the	Ukrainian	budget	in	2010	alone	were	at	around	
US$500	million.	Livela	was	linked	to	politicians	of	the	Party	of	Regions	which	
took	power	at	that	time.	However,	everything	suggests	that	this	company	also	
has	connections	with	Ihor	Kolomoyskyi,	who	has	been	the	main	player	on	the	
oil	market	for	many	years.	
When	Viktor	Yanukovych	governed	 the	 country	 (2010–2014),	 the	 schemes	of	
illegal	fuel	imports	also	became	more	advanced	because	his	inner	circle	(‘the	
family’)	was	involved	in	them.	One	of	the	most	rapidly	developing	companies	at	
25	 Дмитрий	Гнап,	Александр	Акименко,	Анна	Бабинец,	Ливела	и	миллиарды,	Ukrayin-
ska Pravda,	11	October	2011;	http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/articles/2011/10/24/6691712/
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that	time	in	the	fuel	import	and	sale	sector	(BRSM-Nafta)	was	owned	by	Eduard	
Stavytsky,	 the	 then	minister	of	energy.	The	grey	 fuel	economy	reached	a	 re-
cord-high	level	at	that	time.	According	to	cautious	estimates	from	independent	
Ukrainian	experts,	in	2013	the	volume	of	illegal	imports	and	of	fuels	originat-
ing	from	illegal	domestic	production	reached	around	2.3	million	tonnes26.	This	
was	above	all	petrol	because	the	excise	duty	on	it	was	four	times	higher	than	
that	on	diesel	oil.	The	Ukrainian	budget	lost	around	one	billion	US	dollars	due	
to	this.	The	massive	illegal	imports	of	cheap	fuels	also	led	to	the	closures	of	the	
Odessa	and	Lysychansk	refineries	(months	before	the	closure	of	the	latter	its	
director	pointed	directly	to	the	risk	of	withholding	production	unless	the	gov-
ernment	took	measures	to	protect	the	domestic	refining	industry).	
After	 the	Maidan	 revolution,	 the	 untaxed	 fuel	 situation	 improved	 to	 a	 cer-
tain	extent.	The	greatest	success	was	achieved	in	combating	the	smuggling	of	
petroleum	products	supplied	to	the	Ukrainian	market	via	sea	ports.	Mikheil	
Saakashvili,	who	was	governor	of	Odessa	Oblast	 for	a	year	or	 so	until	Octo-
ber	 2016,	waged	 a	 successful	war	 on	 this	 practice.	The	previously	 function-
ing	schemes	involved	declaring	imports	of	fuels	by	sea	at	quantities	that	were	
many	times	lower	than	the	real	volume27.
While	fuel	smuggling	is	widespread	in	southern	Ukraine	due	to	the	proxim-
ity	of	the	sea	ports,	and	in	Donbas,	fuel	fraud	and	illegal	production	is	a	com-
mon	practice	in	the	other	regions.	This	is	done	by	various	fuel	bases	and	mini	
refineries;	the	estimated	number	of	these	could	be	as	high	as	120.	Real	fuel	is	
‘multiplied’	with	the	use	of	various	kinds	of	components.	This	is	possible	due	
to	permission	from	local	governments,	tax	services	and	the	Security	Service	
of	Ukraine	who	benefit	financially	from	this.	One	example	is	the	sale	of	petrol	
by	Privat	Group.	In	2014	this	reached	930,000	tonnes	despite	the	fact	that	the	
Kremenchuk	refinery	it	controls	produced	only	460,000	tonnes	and	imported	
150,000	tonnes	within	that	timeframe.	The	difference	of	320,000	tonnes	(30%)	
can	be	qualified	as	a	product	of	the	grey	economy.	Furthermore,	according	to	
tests	conducted,	as	much	as	80%	of	the	petrol	sold	failed	to	meet	the	standard	
declared28.
26	 Сергей	Куюн,	Эволюция	“тени”,	Zerkalo Nedeli,	28	November	2014;	http://gazeta.zn.ua/en-
ergy_market/evolyuciya-teni-_.html
27	 Сергей	Куюн,	Неуловимый	акциз,	Zerkalo Nedeli,	24	April	2015;	http://gazeta.zn.ua/ener-
gy_market/neulovimyy-akciz-_.html	
28	 Бензин	течет	мимо	бюджета,	Zerkalo Nedeli,	21	December	2012;	http://gazeta.zn.ua/ECO-
NOMICS/benzin_techet_mimo_byudzheta.html
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The	state	has	been	making	attempts	to	take	some	measures	to	combat	illegal	
production	and	tax	evasion.	A	system	for	monitoring	fuel	production	and	re-
tail	sale	has	been	in	operation	since	April	2016	and	is	expected	to	bring	about	
a	situation	in	which	a	filling	station	will	be	able	to	sell	fuel	only	at	the	amount	it	
bought	and	paid	excise	duty	for.	Furthermore,	higher	taxes	have	been	imposed	
on	the	components	used	to	‘multiply’	fuel,	which	is	expected	to	reduce	the	at-
tractiveness	of	such	schemes.	
Despite	some	progress	seen	in	combating	illegal	production	and	fuel	sale,	the	
grey	 economy	will	 still	 form	 an	 essential	 part	 of	 the	 Ukrainian	 petroleum	
product	market	due	to	the	high	profitability	of	this	business	and	the	inalter-
ably	corrupt	government,	 law	enforcement	agencies,	prosecution	authorities	
and	courts.	According	to	calculations	provided	by	Ukrainian	experts,	the	sale	
of	one	million	tonnes	of	 illegal	 fuel	can	generate	around	US$650	million	net	
profit	in	the	case	of	petrol	and	around	US$450	million	in	the	case	of	diesel	oil29.
29	 Олександр	Мельник,	Нафтопродукти.	Чи	потрібна	в	Україні	нафтопереробна	про-
ми	словість?,	EIRCentr,	11	August	2016;	http://eircenter.com/ua-analiitika/chastina-p%E2-
%80%99yata-naftoprodukti-chi-potribna-v-ukrayini-naftopererobna-promislovisto/
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VII. the orGanIsatIon oF the Fuel retaIl 
market
Over	6,500	filling	stations	operate	 in	Ukraine.	Ten	networks	control	around	
75%	of	the	market.	The	fuel	sale	market	can	be	divided	into	the	three	main	seg-
ments:
1. The premium class networks (including WOG, Okko, Shell, Amic and 
Socar) have the greatest market share. In aggregate, they have around 
1,100 filling stations but they control as much as 45% of the market share. 
The fuel they sell is the most expensive but its class is the highest and it 
originates from legal sources. These networks are usually honest taxpayers. 
2. The second group, known as ‘privat Group’ (Avias, Ukrnafta, ANO, Sentoza 
and, Maveks networks) because it is owned by Ihor Kolomoyskyi and his 
business partner Henadiy Boholyubov or the companies de facto controlled 
by them (the state-owned Ukrnafta). Its market share is around 30%, and it 
sells fuel via around 1,500 filling stations. The fuel they sell is the cheapest 
on the market, but its quality varies. 
3. The third group includes the remaining retailers who have the largest 
number of stations (around 3,600) but at the same time their market share is 
only 25%. The fuel sold by these networks is usually cheap but of low quality 
and often originating from the grey economy.
Chart 14. The market share of the major filling stations in 2015 (%) 
Rosneft – 2.8%
Okko – 17.6%
Privat+Ukrnafta – 33.2%
WOG – 11.6%
BRSM-Nafta – 7.1%
KLO – 3.5%
Socar – 2.4%
Amic (LUKoil) – 2.4%
Shell – 2.2%
UPG – 1.5%
Parallel – 0.9%
others – 14.8%
Data: BiznesCensor
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The	share	of	filling	stations	controlled	by	foreign	capital	does	not	exceed	15%.	
The	largest	networks	are	those	controlled	by	Russia’s	Rosneft	and	Tatneft,	Brit-
ish-Dutch	Shell,	Azerbaijan’s	Socar	and	Austria’s	AMIC	(the	latter	bought	its	
network	of	230	stations	in	2014	from	LUKoil	for	US$300	million;	it	most	likely	
has	capital	links	with	LUKoil’s	owners).	
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VIII. the sIGnIFIcance oF ukraIne as a transIt 
country 
Ukraine	has	one	of	Europe’s	longest	oil	transport	systems;	its	operator	is	the	
state-owned	company	Ukrtransnafta.	Its	oil	pipelines	have	a	total	length	of	
4,671	km	and	are	accompanied	by	51	compressor	stations.	The	transport	ca-
pacity	of	the	oil	pipelines	on	entry	from	the	Russian	and	Belarusian	borders’	
side	 is	 114	million	 tonnes	 and	 on	 exit	 56	million	 tonnes	 (borders	 with	 EU	
member	states).	
Three	transit	oil	mains	run	through	Ukraine:
•	Druzhba,	 transporting	 oil	 from	 the	 Belarusian	 border	 to	 Slovakia	 and	
Hungary,	has	been	 in	operation	since	the	 late	1960s,	although	its	signifi-
cance	has	noticeably	fallen	over	the	past	decade	or	so.	
•	Pridneprovsky, transporting	oil	from	the	northern	and	eastern	borders	
with	Russia	(the	areas	close	to	Sumy	and	Luhansk)	to	the	Lysychansk	and	
Kremenchuk	 refineries,	 and	 then	 running	 to	 the	 ports	 in	 Kherson	 and	
Odessa.	This	pipeline,	Ukraine’s	oldest,	has	not	transported	oil	from	Russia	
since	2010.	However,	at	the	beginning	of	2017,	it	began	transporting	Azer-
baijani	oil	to	Ukrtatnafta	in	Kremenchuk.
•	Odessa–Brody,	 connecting	 the	 Pivdennyi	 terminal	 near	 Odessa	 (with	
a	transport	capacity	of	14.5	million	tonnes,	adjusted	to	receive	tankers	car-
rying	 up	 to	 100,000	tonnes)	with	 Brody	 in	western	 Ukraine,	 where	 the	
pipeline	is	connected	with	the	Druzhba	system.	This	is	Ukraine’s	newest	oil	
pipeline,	launched	in	2002.	
Around	55	million	tonnes	of	Russian	oil	used	to	be	transported	annually	via	
Ukrainian	territory	in	the	1990s.	However,	Russia	decided	to	develop	its	own	
export	system	terminating	at	Russian	ports	to	thus	avoid	dependence	on	tran-
sit	countries,	including	Ukraine.	A	key	element	of	this	strategy	was	the	launch	
of	the	Baltic	Pipeline	System	(BPS)	in	2001	running	to	the	terminal	in	Primorsk	
(Leningrad	Oblast),	with	an	annual	capacity	of	76	million	tonnes.	As	a	result,	
the	role	of	Druzhba	and	transport	via	its	Ukrainian	section	fell	significantly	
–	the	transport	volume	was	reduced	by	around	20	million	tonnes	within	two	
years.	The	BPS-2	oil	pipeline,	with	a	 transport	capacity	of	36	million	tonnes,	
was	put	into	operation	in	2012.	Russia	also	developed	the	transport	capacity	of	
the	pipelines	running	to	its	own	Black	Sea	ports.	
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Chart 15. Oil transit via Ukrainian territory (million tonnes)
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Data: Ukrtransnafta, Ministry of Energy and Coal Mining
Russia’s	policy	 involving	bypassing	 transit	 countries	 in	 oil	 exports	 to	 the	West	
resulted	in	a	reduction	of	oil	transit	via	Ukraine	by	over	70%	over	fifteen	years.	
In	2004–2008,	Russia	transported	up	to	several	million	tonnes	of	oil	annually	via	
the	Brody–Odessa	oil	pipeline	(reversal);	this	was	intended	at	preventing	the	use	
of	this	route	for	diversifying	oil	supplies	from	other	than	Russian	sources.	How-
ever,	finally	the	project	was	discontinued	due	to	being	economically	non-viable.	
At	present,	Druzhba	is	the	only	operational	main	oil	pipeline	in	Ukraine	trans-
porting	Russian	oil	to	Slovakia,	the	Czech	Republic,	Hungary	and	Bosnia.	Over	
the	past	five	years,	it	transported	around	15	million	tonnes	of	oil	annually.	In	
2016,	the	volume	transported	reached	a	record-low	level	of	13.8	million	tonnes.
Kyiv	has	had	no	visible	policy	to	develop	the	pipeline	system	over	the	past	two	
decades.	This	was	an	effect	of	 the	same	factors	which	 led	to	the	degradation	
of	the	Ukrainian	refining	industry,	in	particular—to	corruption.	The	manage-
ment	of	the	state-owned	company	UkrTransNafta,	as	a	result	of	the	govern-
ment’s	 concession,	was	 informally	 entrusted	 to	Privat	Group.	This	 company	
had	 a	 monopoly	 in	 the	 oil	 pipeline	 operation	 sector	 and	 in	 2009–2014	was	
managed	by	Oleksandr	Lazorko,	the	former	director	of	the	Drohobych	refin-
ery	(owned	by	Privat).	Control	of	Ukrtransnafta	has	in	fact	become	an	instru-
ment	for	combating	competition	for	Ihor	Kolomoyskyi’s	firm	in	the	oil	sector.	
Lazorko	 caused,	 for	 example,	 the	 discontinuation	 of	 Russian	 oil	 supplies	 to	
LUKoil’s	refinery	in	Odessa	in	order	to	ensure	supplies	of	crude	oil	via	Odessa	
to	the	Kremenchuk	refinery	controlled	by	Privat.	
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The	case	of	Ukrtransnafta	lays	bare	the	absence	of	the	state	in	this	strategically	
important	sector	and	Privat	Group’s	management	based	on	overexploitation.	
Towards	the	end	of	this	team’s	rule,	i.e.	already	after	the	Maidan	revolution,	
it	began	pumping	so-called	‘technological	oil’	out	of	those	transit	oil	pipelines	
that	had	not	been	in	use	in	the	past	few	years30.	This	in	particular	concerned	
the	Michurinsk–Kremenchuk	 pipeline	 and	 probably	 also	 the	 Odessa–Brody	
pipeline.	According	to	this	corruption	scheme,	the	oil	from	the	pipeline	used	
for	 its	maintenance	was	 sold	 to	money	mules	 for	 the	price	of	US$30–40	per	
barrel,	while	 its	market	value	was	perhaps	double	that.	The	extent	to	which	
technological	oil	has	been	pumped	out	of	the	pipelines	is	unclear,	but	it	can	be	
assumed	that	it	was	worth	hundreds	of	millions	of	dollars.	
Another	problem	which	Ukrtransnafta	has	is	oil	theft	from	transit	pipelines	via	
illegal	drilling.	Annual	oil	losses	reach	around	40,000–50,000	tonnes.	Most	of-
ten	this	is	possible	due	to	‘protection’	offered	by	local	police	and	the	SBU.
30	 “Приват”	заблокировал	государственную	нефть	“Укртранснафты”	на	200	млн	грн,	
Zerkalo Nedeli,	24	July	2015;	http://zn.ua/ECONOMICS/privat-zabral-u-gosudarstvennoy-
ukrtransnafty-nefti-na-200-mln-grn-183438_.html	
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Ix. conclusIon: the state stIll has 
no strateGy
The	formally	applicable	oil	strategy	of	Ukraine	to	2030,	approved	in	July	2013,	
envisaged	 that	 fuel	 consumption	 in	Ukraine	would	 grow	 to	 11.2–11.7	million	
tonnes	 in	 2015	(in	 fact,	 it	 reached	 7.4	million	 tonnes),	 and	 oil	 processing	 at	
Ukrainian	refineries	would	then	reach	11–13.5	million	tonnes	(in	 fact,	 it	was	
2.5	million	tonnes).	The	document	diagnosed	that	the	Ukrainian	oil	sector	was	
in	 crisis	 and	admitted	 that	 one	of	 the	main	obstacles	 to	 the	development	of	
Ukrainian	refineries	was	the	unfavourable	customs	regime	and	that	“the	state	
should	stimulate	the	development	of	the	refining	industry	to	reach	a	competi-
tive	level	necessary	to	satisfy	the	demand	on	the	domestic	market	(…)	that	the	
state	should	develop	a	special	programme	for	supporting	production	and	mod-
ernisation	of	the	refineries”31.	The	strategy	expressed	the	hope	that	Ukrainian	
refineries	would	be	able	to	reach	an	adequate	level	of	technological	advance-
ment	and	competitiveness	by	2020.
One	obvious	reason	why	Ukraine	has	found	it	impossible	to	achieve	the	goals	
it	set	itself	was	the	Russian	aggression	and	ongoing	conflict	in	Donbas,	which	
worsened	the	crisis	of	the	Ukrainian	state	and	economy.	However,	this	is	nei-
ther	the	sole	nor	even	the	main	reason.	Almost	three	years	since	the	victorious	
Revolution	of	Dignity,	Kyiv	still	has	no	consistent	policy	aimed	at	stimulating	
the	modernisation	and	development	of	its	own	refining	industry.	The	obstacles	
are	the	same	as	those	seen	over	the	past	few	years:	the	enormous	corruption,	
the	involvement	of	a	section	of	the	government	elite	and	the	law	enforcement	
agencies	in	various	kinds	of	corruption	schemes,	the	appropriation	of	private	
property	by	oligarchs	in	state-owned	companies	from	the	oil	sector	(Ukrnafta,	
UkrGasVydobuvannya	and	UkrTransNafta)	and	the	lack	of	a	concept	for	their	
development.	
As	a	result,	the	degradation	of	the	Ukrainian	oil	sector	is	continuing.	Howev-
er,	this	does	not	affect	the	availability	of	fuel	at	affordable	prices	at	Ukrainian	
filling	stations	and	to	corporate	clients.	This	is	the	case	because	a	competitive	
fuel	market	has	emerged	in	Ukraine	over	the	past	decade	de	facto	without	the	
state’s	interference	(and	often	despite	its	measures	to	combat	it).	However,	this	
market	is	85%	dependent	on	imported	petroleum	products.
31	 Енергетична	стратегія	України	на	період	до	2030	р.;	http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/
show/n0002120–13	
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The	consequences	include	not	only	the	insufficient	development	of	the	Ukrain-
ian	oil	industry	but	also	the	unusually	heavy	reliance	the	Ukrainian	market	
has	on	fuel	imports	mainly	from	the	neighbouring	countries	(above	all	Belarus,	
Russia	and	Lithuania).	This	adversely	affects	the	Ukrainian	trade	balance,	de-
prives	thousands	of	Ukrainian	workers	of	jobs	at	Ukrainian	refineries,	reduces	
state	revenues	from	taxes,	and	contributes	to	the	flourishing	of	the	grey	fuel	
economy	resulting	in	supplies	of	low-quality	fuel.	An	additional	consequence	
of	the	present	situation	is	its	adverse	effect	on	Ukraine’s	energy	security.	The	
state	does	not	require	importers	to	create	any	reserves	in	case	of	emergency	(it	
is	a	standard	in	EU	member	states	to	maintain	a	90-day	fuel	reserve).
Everything	 suggests	 that	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	Ukrainian	 oil	market	will	 con-
tinue.	Since	 the	Maidan	revolution,	 the	 state	has	not	adopted	any	new	poli-
cy	towards	this	sector	of	the	economy.	It	was	only	in	December	2016	that	the	
Ministry	of	Energy	and	Coal	Mining	presented	the	Draft	Energy	Strategy	of	
Ukraine	to	2035.	However,	this	document	is	too	vague	and	overly	optimistic	
at	many	points,	which	means	that	the	state	is	still	a	long	way	from	adopting	
a	final	document	that	might	bring	about	a	change	in	its	policy.	While	positive	
and	unprecedented	reforms	have	been	implemented	in	the	Ukrainian	gas	sec-
tor,	the	crisis	situation	in	the	oil	industry	is	ongoing.	Considering	the	trends	
outlined	in	this	report,	the	existing	condition	is	likely	to	be	maintained	in	the	
coming	years.	
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